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Should Access to Medicines And 
TRIPS Flexibilities Be Limited To 
Specific Diseases? 
Kevin Outterson† 
I. DISEASE-BASED LIMITATIONS IN GLOBAL PATENT LAW 
The health needs of most of the world’s population are not well served by 
patent-based pharmaceutical markets.  The poor in low- and medium-income 
countries (LMICs) lack the financial resources to sustain the attention of 
global commercial drug companies.  After an extensive consultation process, 
in 2006, the World Health Organization’s Commission on Innovation, 
Intellectual Property and Public Health issued its Report (the WHO CIPIH 
Report), finding this concern to be significant: 
In the context of our work one of the important points is that, 
where the market has very limited purchasing power, as is the 
case for diseases affecting millions of poor people in developing 
countries, patents are not a relevant factor or effective in 
stimulating R&D and bringing new products to market.1 
On this issue, the WHO CIPIH Report was preceded by the Access to 
Medicines movement, an informal coalition of civil society organizations such 
as Médecins Sans Frontières, Treatment Action Campaign, Health GAP, 
Oxfam, and Knowledge Ecology International (formerly the Consumer Project 
on Technology).  These groups and many others identified patents on 
pharmaceuticals as an inappropriate barrier to access in developing 
countries.2  They devoted particular attention to the World Trade 
                                                 
†  Associate Professor, Boston University School of Law.  Editor’s Note: This symposium 
was held at Boston University in February 2008.  In May 2008, the 61st World Health 
Assembly met in Geneva and adopted a Global Health Strategy on Public Health, Innovation 
and Intellectual Property, following the final meeting of the Inter-Govermental Working 
Group (IGWG 2) on May 3, 2008.  This paper was circulated in draft form at IGWG 2, but has 
not been modified to account for the final resolution.  In general, the WHA final resolution is 
supportive of the approach taken in this article, due to the efforts of many delegations and 
observers. 
1  World Health Organization, Report of the Commission on Intellectual 
Property Rights, Innovation and Public Health 22 (2006) [hereinafter WHO CIPIH 
Report]. 
2  See, e.g., Médecins Sans Frontières, A Guide to the Post-2005 World: TRIPS, 
R&D and Access to Medicines (2005), www.msf.org/msfinternational/invoke.cfm?compone 
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Organization TRIPS Agreement, which is the minimum global legal standard 
for pharmaceutical patents.3  In response to challenges about the need for 
innovation, some have reframed the movement as “Access + Innovation.”  This 
article follows in the Access + Innovation genre, attempting to simultaneously 
address both equitable access and optimal innovation.4 
Global patent-based pharmaceutical companies and the United States 
Trade Representative (USTR) have not been particularly supportive of the 
Access + Innovation agenda.5  Many attempts have been resisted, even to the 
point of suing South Africa for its use of unlicensed AIDS drugs in the face of 
an epidemic.6  In response to sustained global pressure, the companies 
eventually conceded the case in South Africa, and the WTO members 
unanimously adopted the Doha Declaration in November 2001.  However, 
several attempts have been made to limit access initiatives and TRIPS 
flexibilities to particular diseases, namely AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria, or 
more generally to infectious public health emergencies.7  
The primary concern appears to be profit-driven:  companies are 
concerned that any flexibilities for LMICs could lead to price erosion in high-
income markets, through physical or virtual arbitrage,8 demands for expanded 
access, compulsory licensing, or other TRIPS flexibilities.9  These concerns are 
especially acute for blockbuster drugs treating major chronic diseases.   
                                                                                                                      
nt=article&objectid=88694E5B-0FED-434A-A21EDA1006002653&method=full_html.  
3  See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Annex 1C 
art. 8(1), Apr. 15, 1994,3 3 I.L.M. 81, available at www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips.pdf (Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization) [hereinafter 
TRIPS or TRIPS Agreement].  
4  For a longer treatment on this balance, see Kevin Outterson, Pharmaceutical 
Arbitrage:  Balancing Access and Innovation in International Prescription Drug Markets, 5 
Yale J. Health Pol’y, L. & Ethics 193-286 (2005), available at 
www.ssrn.com/abstract=567742 [hereinafter Pharmaceutical Arbitrage]. 
5  See  e.g., Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge Diplomacy: Global Competition and 
the Politics of Intellectual Property (Brookings Institution Press 1998); Duncan 
Matthews, Globalizing Intellectual Property Rights (Richard Higgott ed., Routledge 
2002); Peter Drahos with John Braithwaite, Information Feudalism: Who Owns the 
Knowledge Economy? (The New Press 2002); Susan K. Sell, Power and Ideas: North-
South Politics of Intellectual Property and Antitrust (James N. Rosenau, ed., State 
University of New York Press 1998); Susan K. Sell, Private Power, Public law: The 
Globalization of Intellectual Property Rights (Steve Smith, ed., Cambridge University 
Press 2003); Laurence R. Helfer, Regime Shifting: The TRIPS Agreement and New Dynamics 
of International Intellectual Property Lawmaking, 29 Yale J. Int’l L. 1 (2004).  For a report 
that ranks pharmaceutical companies based upon their commitment to access initiatives, see 
Access to Medicine Index, www.atmindex.org (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).  
6  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 121. 
7  See infra Section III; see also U.S. Gen. Accounting Office, GAO Report 07-1198, 
U.S. Trade Policy Guidance on WTO Declaration on Access to Medicines May Need 
Clarification 15, 19, 23 (Sept. 2007) [hereinafter, GAO Trade Policy Report]. 
8  Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 4, at 193-286; Outterson & Kesselheim, 
Market-Based Licensing for HPV Vaccines in Developing Countries, 27 Health Aff. 131, 131 
(2008); GAO Trade Policy Report, supra note 7, at 24; WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, 
at 111-12.  For a recent example of the conventional view, see Patricia M. Danzon, At What 
Price?, 449 Nature 176 (2007). 
9  Many LMICs have not taken advantage of the flexibilities permitted under TRIPS.  
William New, Disparities Seen In Developing Countries’ TRIPS Implementation (Dec. 11, 
2007), available at www.ip-watch.org/weblog/index.php?p=865.  TRIPS permitted many 
developing countries to implement its provisions on a delayed basis.  TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 3, at arts. 65-66.  After extensions, most developing countries must have 
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1090270
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Nothing in the TRIPS Agreement limits compulsory licenses or other 
flexibilities to a narrow category of diseases.  In the Doha Declaration itself, 
the U.S. requested an explicit limitation to particular diseases, and was the 
last country to assent to the unanimous resolution.10  The ultimate 
compromise language states: 
We recognize the gravity of the public health problems afflicting 
many developing and least-developed countries, especially those 
resulting from HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria and other 
epidemics.11  
At first blush, this appears to be a disease-specific limitation, but the Doha 
Declaration merely uses the Big 3 to illustrate examples of “national 
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency.”12  The Doha 
Declaration clearly supports WTO Members’ rights to utilize TRIPS 
flexibilities – including compulsory licensure and parallel trade – to “protect 
public health” without regard to the type of disease:13 
Accordingly, while reiterating our commitment to the TRIPS 
Agreement, we affirm that the Agreement can and should be 
interpreted and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO 
Members’ right to protect public health and, in particular, to 
promote access to medicines for all.14   
This point has been honored primarily in the breach.  Under the Doha 
Declaration “Paragraph 6” process, compulsory licenses could be issued for 
export to low-income countries, bypassing Article 31(f) of the TRIPS 
Agreement, which restricts compulsory licenses predominantly for domestic 
use.  When Canada enacted its Access to Medicines Regime to permit 
Paragraph 6 exports, the law limited compulsory licenses to specific listed 
                                                                                                                      
implemented the TRIPS Agreement by January 1, 2005, but the thirty “least developed 
countries” may defer full implementation for pharmaceutical products until 2016.  World 
Trade Organization, Doha Ministerial Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health 
of 20 Nov. 2001, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, ¶ 7 (2001) [hereinafter Doha Declaration].  Despite 
these concessions, all but three of Africa’s Least Developed Countries (LDCs) have already 
adopted patent laws for pharmaceuticals.  Phil Thorpe, Study on the Implementation of 
the TRIPS Agreement by Developing Countries 1 (Comm. on Intellectual Prop. Rights, 
Study Paper 7) (2004).   Similarly, Latin America has not fully availed itself of TRIPS 
flexibilities, with varying levels of sensitivity between countries.  Gabriela Costa Chaves and 
Maria Auxiliadora Oliveira, A Proposal For Measuring The Degree of Public Health-Sensitivity 
of Patent Legislation In The Context of the WTO TRIPS Agreement, 85 Bull. World Health 
Org. (Jan. 2007).  The TRIPS Agreement merely sets minimum periods of IP protection; the 
United States can still unilaterally extend patent protection, and has done so with copyright.  
WTO Members are also free to negotiate so-called “TRIPS-plus” agreements with additional 
provisions requiring protections in excess of the TRIPS Agreement’s minimum standards.  The 
U.S. has done so with a number of bilateral and multilateral treaties.  Médecins Sans 
Frontières, MSF Briefing note, Access to Medicines at Risk Across the Globe: What 
To Watch Out For in Free Trade Agreements with the United States 4-6 (2004).  For 
an explanation of why most developing country patent offices have not taken full advantage of 
TRIPS flexibilities, see Peter Drahos, “Trust Me”: Patent Offices in Developing Countries, 34 
Am. J.L. & Med. (2008).  
10  GAO Trade Policy Report, supra note 7, at 23.  
11  Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at par. 1. 
12  Id. at par. 5(c).  
13  Id. at par. 4, 5(b), 5(c), 5(d); GAO Trade Policy Report, supra note 7, at 11-26. 
14  Doha Declaration, supra note 9, at par. 4. 
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medicines.15  This list has been criticized for its excessive narrowness – only 57 
drugs or vaccines.16  The list is effectively limited to AIDS and off-patent 
medications.  Many of the listed drugs treat AIDS; and most of those AIDS 
drugs are available generically already.  Almost all of the other drugs on the 
list are off-patent or face legal generic competition in a similar form.17  The 
only patented non-AIDS drugs on the list are eflornithine (for the treatment 
of African sleeping sickness) and levofloxacin (an important antibiotic).  
Others are just curious choices considering the global burden of disease 
(testosterone injection).  Ivermectin is also listed, despite Merck’s promise to 
donate it in the river blindness campaign.  The very narrow positive list in the 
Canadian Access to Medicines Regime operates as a disease-specific 
limitation on compulsory licensure under Paragraph 6. 
More recently, major drug companies and USTR have resisted Thailand’s 
efforts to issue compulsory licenses on patented drugs for heart disease and 
cancer.18  When Thailand attempted to use the very TRIPS flexibilities 
guaranteed and encouraged by the Doha Declaration, a backlash ensued from 
conservative media, pharmaceutical manufacturers, and the U.S. government.  
The Wall Street Journal editorial page attacked the Thai compulsory 
licenses as “seizures” that cynically distorted WTO rules, while a property-
rights activist group charged the Thai government with violating global trade 
rules.19  Abbott, the manufacturer of lopinavir/ritonavir, withdrew pending 
applications for drugs in Thailand, including a heat-stable version of an 
important fixed-dose combination drug for AIDS with particular usefulness in 
a tropical climate.20  The USTR then placed Thailand on the special 301 
“priority watch list” for alleged violations of intellectual property law, 
mentioning in particular the compulsory license.21   
                                                 
15  The Jean Chretien Pledge to Africa Act, 2004 S.C., ch. 23 (Can.), available at 
www.canlii.org/ca/as/2004/c23/part2620%2Ehtml [hereinafter Canadian Access to 
Medicines Regime or CAMR]. The law created a positive list of drugs eligible for compulsory 
licensure, a procedural hurdle not required by the WTO.  Id  at Sched. 1.   
16  Jillian C. Cohen-Kohler et al., Canada’s Implementation of the Paragraph 6 
Decision:  Is It Sustainable Public Policy?, 3 Globalization & Health (2007), available at 
www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/12.     
17  The off-patent drugs include: amphotericin B, azithromycin, 
beclomethasone/beclometasone, ceftazidime, ceftriaxone, ciclosporin(e), ciprofloxacin, 
daunorubicin, doxorubicin, enalapril, erythromycin, etoposide, ibuprofen, isoniazid + 
pyrazinamide, insulin, ivermectin, levodopa + carbidopa, lithium carbonate, metoclopramide, 
metronidazole, morphine, nifedipine, nitrofurantoin, ofloxacin, potassium chloride, rifampin, 
salbutamol/albuterol, timolol.  Patent status was taken from the U.S. FDA Orange Book.  See 
Electronic Orange Book, Approved Drug Products with Therapeutic Equivalents,  
www.fda.gov/cder/ob/default.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2008).  
18  Apiradee Treerutkuarkul, Talks With Pharma-Giants Collapse, Bangkok Post, Dec. 
18, 2007; Brent Savoie, Thailand’s Test:  Compulsory Licensing In An Era of Epidemiologic 
Transition, 48 Va. J. Int’l L. 211 (2007); Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 8, at 133.  
19  Editorial, Bangkok’s Drug War Goes Global, Wall Street Journal, Mar. 7, 2007; 
M. Vaughan, In Clash with Activists, Critics Charge Thailand Violation of Trade Rules, 
Intell. Prop. Watch, Mar. 19, 2007.  
20  Press Release, Médecins Sans Frontières, Abbott Should Reconsider its 
Unacceptable Decision to Not Sell New Medicines in Thailand (March 23, 2007), available at 
www.worldaidscampaign.info/index.php/en/campaigns/in_country_campaigns/asia/abbott_s
hould_reconsider_its_unacceptable_decision_to_not_sell_new_medicines_in_thailand.  
21  Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2007 Special 301 Report 27 (2007) 
[hereinafter,Special 301 Report]. 
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The TRIPS Agreement is subject to dispute resolution under the WTO 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, but the U.S. Government is unlikely to 
initiate a WTO panel against Thailand.  The TRIPS Agreement authorizes 
members like Thailand to issue compulsory licenses for these drugs.22   For all 
the bluster in the Wall Street Journal, it is clear that the controlling legal 
texts do not limit the use of TRIPS flexibilities to any particular set of 
diseases.  
Nor should they.  From the perspective of public health, limiting access 
programs and TRIPS flexibilities to particular diseases would be quite 
dangerous and unnecessary.  Dangerous because the diseases of the world’s 
rich and poor countries are converging, including non-communicative 
diseases such as heart disease, stroke, diabetes, cancer and depression.  
Radically cheaper medicines for these conditions could significantly improve 
health in LMICs.  Limitation is also unnecessary because proven tools can be 
deployed to preserve high-income markets while LMICs pursue equitable 
flexibilities.23  
Perhaps another factor is at work here as well.  An implicit assumption is 
that the diseases of developing countries are essentially different from 
diseases in the United States or Europe.  Paradigmatic cases include exotic 
tropical diseases such as ebola hemorrhagic fever24 and onchocerciasis (river 
blindness).  These neglected diseases and their victims are so remote from the 
U.S. experience that special charitable programs seem unobjectionable.  Only 
a very small portion of the disease burden in developing countries comes from 
these exotic tropical neglected diseases.25  Drugs produced for high-income 
markets can treat most of the global disease burden, such as the pressing need 
for cancer therapies in LMICs, where cancer deaths outnumber AIDS 
deaths.26  The number one cause of death in LMICs is not a neglected tropical 
disease, but a familiar “rich country” killer: heart disease.27 
To date, the important global legal texts retain broad application to all 
relevant diseases, but some parties continue to propose disease-specific 
limitations, most recently in the World Health Organization’s 
Intergovernmental Working Group on Public Health, Innovation and 
                                                 
22  Indeed, as the GAO reports, the USTR itself concedes the point.  See GAO Trade 
Policy Report, supra note 7, at 48-49.  The USTR stated that the decision to place Thailand 
on the Special 301 “priority watch list” was based “not solely on [Thailand’s] compulsory 
license decision.”  Id. at 49.   
23  For my most recent defense of equitable access in the face of diversion, see generally 
Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 8.  For an earlier defense set in a broader theoretical 
context, see Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 4, at 261-68.  In the context of adaptive 
innovation leading to the creation of a distinctive product, diversion is much less likely. 
24  For more information about ebola hemorrhagic fever, see The Centers for Disease 
Control and Prevention, Special Pathogens Branch (2006) available at 
www.cdc.gov/ncidod/dvrd/spb/mnpages/dispages/ebola.htm.  
25  See generally Roger S. Magnusson, Non-Communicable Diseases and Global Health 
Governance:  Enhancing Global Processes to Improve Health Development, 3 Globalization & 
Health (May 22, 2007) available at www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/2.  
26  Institute of Medicine, Cancer Control Opportunities in Low- and Middle-
Income Countries (National Academies Press 2007). 
27  See generally Thomas A. Gaziano, Reducing The Growing Burden of Cardiovascular 
Disease in the Developing World, 26 Health Aff. 13 (2007); The Center for Global Health 
and Economic Development, A Race Against Time:  The Challenge of Cardiovascular 
Disease in Developing Economies (New York:  Columbia University, 2004). 
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Intellectual Property (the “WHO IGWG”).28  The WHO IGWG’s task is to 
distill the WHO CIPIH Report into a global strategy and plan of action.  This 
article hopes to influence the final text of the IGWG Global Strategy, 
finding that disease-specific limitations on access programs and TRIPS 
flexibilities are inappropriate in markets for medicines, but may have a place 
in markets for neglected disease innovation. 
II.   GLOBAL PHARMACEUTICAL MARKETS FOR MEDICINES & 
INNOVATION 
In order to understand the relevance of disease-specific limitations, we 
must distinguish between markets for medicines and markets for innovation.  
The patent system joins them together, using patent-protected high prices for 
medicines to create markets for innovation.  James Love and Tim Hubbard 
have suggested separating these markets through a prize system and generic 
licensing,29 but for the purposes of this article we need only to conceptually 
distinguish between the two.  My aim is to evaluate whether significant 
differences exist between high-income countries and LMICs that are relevant 
to global pharmaceutical markets.  
A. Markets for Medicines 
IP rights stimulate pharmaceutical innovation by creating an artificial 
market enforced by patents, trademarks, and exclusivity periods.  IP rights 
enable companies to charge higher prices, which make these medicines more 
expensive in the absence of generic competition.  Patent rents can price most 
of humanity out of the market, reducing access to life-saving medicines.30  
Paul Hunt, the UN Special Rapporteur on the right to the highest attainable 
standard of health, estimates that more than 2 billion people are effectively 
priced out of the market for patented drugs.31  This message has been 
                                                 
28  World Health Organization Intergovernmental Working Group on Public 
Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property, Draft Global Strategy and Plan of 
Action on Public Health, Innovation, and Intellectual Property, A/PHI/IGWG/2/2 
(July 31, 2007), available at www.who.int/gb/phi/pdf/igwg2/PHI_IGWG2_2-en.pdf 
[hereinafter WHO IGWG].  An early form of this article was submitted to the WHO IGWG 
Public Hearing in September, 2007, available at www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/second/co 
ntributions_section1/Section1_Kevin_Outterson_Boston_Uni_Full_Contribution.pdf. 
29  Tim Hubbard & James Love, A New Trade Framework for Global Healthcare R&D, 2 
PLoS Biology 147 (Feb. 2004).  Other proposals for separating these markets have been 
recently summarized in Carl Nathan, Aligning Pharmaceutical Innovation With Medical Need, 
13 Nat. Med. 304-308 (2007).  The WHO CIPIH Report recommended further investigation 
of this proposal.  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 178 (Recommendation 3.6).  For a 
philosophical approach, see Thomas Pogge, Harnessing the Power of Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, in The Power of Pills:  Social, Ethical, and Legal Issues in Drug 
Development, Marketing, and Pricing 142-49 (Jillian Claire Cohen et al. eds., 2006). 
30  F.M. Scherer, A Note on Global Welfare in Pharmaceutical Patenting, 27 World 
Econ. 1127, 1141 (2004); Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 4, at 193; Robert Steinbrook, 
Closing the Affordability Gap for Drugs in Low-Income Countries, 357 New Eng. J. Med. 
1996-99 (2007). 
31  Paul Hunt, Human Rights Guidelines for Pharmaceutical Companies in Relation to 
Access to Medicines, 19 Sept. 2007, at 1 (Draft for Consultation), available at 
www2.essex.ac.uk/human_rights_centre/rth/docs/PH%20draft%20guidelines%2019%20sept
%202007.doc; see also Oxfam, Oxfam Briefing Paper 109: Investing For Life:  Meeting Poor 
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articulated for many years by leading advocates for equitable access to 
medicines.32  The WHO CIPIH Report found that the effectiveness of IP 
rights depends greatly on the context, especially the poverty of the patients 
needing medicines: 
But where most consumers of health products are poor, as are the 
great majority in developing countries, the monopoly costs 
associated with patents can limit the affordability of patented 
health-care products required by poor people in the absence of 
other measures to reduce prices or increase funding.  Thus the 
overall effect of intellectual property regimes is context-specific – 
the impact in a country such as India may differ from that in 
Thailand or in Ghana.33 
In wealthier countries, access issues from IP-induced higher prices are 
ameliorated by government-subsidized insurance and other social 
mechanisms.  The global market for medicines in high-income countries 
amounts to over $550 billion in 2006.34  High prescription drug prices are 
often paid by government or social insurance funds.  These payors are the 
primary global markets for patent-based drug companies, even though some 
exercise monopsony power to negotiate lower drug prices.35 Outside of the 
                                                                                                                      
People’s Needs for Access to Medicines Through Responsible Business Practices, Nov. 2007, at 2, 
available at www.oxfam.org/en/files/bp109_investing_for_life_0711.pdf/download.  
32  See, e.g., Médecins Sans Frontières, MSF Campaign Brochure 5 (2004), 
www.msf.org.au/education/resources/access-brochure.pdf (“Medicines aren’t just any 
consumer goods.”); Knowledge Ecology International, IGWG Submission on Collective 
Management of Intellectual Property – The Use of Patent Pools to Expand Access to Needed 
Medical Technologies, Sept. 30, 2007, www.who.int/phi/public_hearings/en/; Oxfam, supra 
note 31.  
33  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 20.  
34  IMS Health estimates the global pharmaceutical market at $643 billion in 2006.  
Press Release, IMS Health, IMS Health Reports Global Pharmaceutical Market Grew 7.0 
Percent in 2006, to $643 Billion (Mar. 20, 2007), available at www.imshealth.com/ims/portal 
/front/articleC/0,2777,6599_3665_80560241,00.html.  Companies do not typically break out 
their financial results by high-income v. low- and medium-income categories, but the World 
Health Assembly estimated that approximately 90% of drug sales are in developed countries.  
Intellectual Property Rights, Innovation, and Public Health, World Health Assembly Res. 
WHA56.27 10th plen. mtg., (May 28, 2003).  My estimates also confirm that 90% or more of 
the patent-based drug companies’ profits derive from high-income countries.  Kevin 
Outterson, Patent Buy-Outs For Global Disease Innovations For Low- and Middle-Income 
Countries, 32 Am. J. L. & Med. 159, 160 (2006).  For Merck, approximately 7.5% of its global 
revenues come from developing countries. Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 8, at 134.  In 
its 2006 Form 10-K filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Merck derived 
more than half of its global revenue from the United States in 2006.  The “other” category 
accounted for 10.6% of global revenues, but this category included Australia and New Zealand 
while excluding Africa and the Middle East.  Merck & Co. Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 
120 n.20 (2007). 
35  U.S. Department of Commerce, Pharmaceutical Price Controls in OECD 
Countries:  Implications For U.S. Consumers, Pricing, Research and Development, 
and Innovation 3 (2004), available at www.ita.doc.gov/td/chemicals/drugpricingstudy.pdf 
(last visited Mar. 27, 2008) [hereinafter OECD Pricing Report]; see also Kevin Outterson, 
Testimony Before the Committee on Health, Education, Labor, & Pensions, United States 
Senate, Hearing on:  Drug Importation:  Would the Price Be Right?  (Feb. 17, 2005) 
(critique of the Department of Commerce Report), available at ssrn.com/abstract=706849.  
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U.S., public or social insurance funds account for the great majority of OECD 
pharmaceutical expenditures.36 
Public subsidies for prescription drug markets are also significant and 
growing in the U.S.  U.S. retail prescription drug expenditures (excluding 
pharmaceuticals purchased by institutions such as hospitals) topped $200 
billion in 2005.37  Public funds accounted for just 27% of this U.S. total in 
2005, but that figure will grow substantially with the establishment of 
Medicare Part D.38  This program is projected to cost over $52 billion in 
2008.39  Many purchases of inpatient pharmaceuticals are paid through public 
funds in Medicare Part A or Medicaid, amounting to tens of billions of dollars 
per year.  Even with these subsidies, drug access problems re-emerge in the 
U.S. when out-of-pocket costs are high.40  
Even privately-insured U.S. purchasers receive significant tax subsidies.  
More than 47% of U.S. outpatient pharmacy expenditures were covered by 
private insurance, which itself draws a significant tax subsidy.41  The income 
tax exclusion for employer-provided health insurance is a tax expenditure 
estimated at $102.3 billion in fiscal year 2004.42  Since outpatient 
pharmaceuticals accounted for approximately 10% of U.S. health spending in 
2005,43 this provision alone is a $10 billion tax expenditure supporting the 
domestic pharmaceutical market.   
B.  Markets for Pharmaceutical Innovation  
Global expenditures for health research totaled $125.8 billion in 2003, 
from both public and private funds.44  Direct expenditures from public funds 
accounts for about 45% of the total, approximately $56.1 billion in 2003.45  
                                                 
36  OECD Pricing Report, supra note 35, at viii-ix. 
37  Aaron Catlin et al., National Health Spending In 2005:  The Slowdown Continues, 26 
Health Aff. 142, 143 exhibit 1 (2007).   
38  Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, National Health 
Expenditures By Type of Service and Source of Funds:  Calendar Years 2006-1960, 
available for download at www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/02_NationalHealth 
AccountsHistorical.asp#TopOfPage (see Prescription Drugs figures at Line 394 in Excel 
Document) [hereinafter Expenditures].  
39  Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: Fiscal Years 2008 
to 2017, 58-59 (Jan. 2007) (Box 3-2).  The figure cited is the gross cost, which is a more 
appropriate measure of government subsidy of prescription drug purchases. 
40  Wenke Hwang et al., Out-of-Pocket Medical Spending for Care of Chronic 
Conditions, 20 Health Aff. 267, 267 (2001); S.B. Soumerai et al., Effects of Medicaid Drug-
Payment Limits on Admission to Hospitals and Nursing Homes 325 N. Engl. J. Med. 1072 
(1991); Bruce Stuart et al., Riding the Rollercoaster:  The Ups and Downs In Out-Of-Pocket 
Spending Under The Standard Medicare Drug Benefit, 24 Health Affairs 1022 (2005); and 
Tseng Chien-Wen, et al., Elderly Patients’ Preferences and Experiences with Providers in 
Managing Their Drug Costs, 55 J. Am. Ger. Soc. 1974, 1974 (2007). 
41  Expenditures, supra note 38.  
42  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-05-690, Expenditures Represent a 
Substantial Federal Commitment and Need to Be Examined 34 tbl. 2 (2005).    
43  Expenditures, supra note 38.  The OECD estimate is higher, at 12.5% but includes 
other nondurable medical goods.  OECD Health Data: 2007, available at 
www.oecd.org/document/16/0,3343,en_2825_495642_2085200_1_1_1_1,00.html 
(pharmaceuticals and other nondurable medical as a percentage of total health expenditures). 
44  Global Forum for Health Research, Monitoring Financial Flows for 
Health Research 35 (2006).  
45  Id. at 39.  
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Public funding includes government grants,46 such as more than $28 billion 
from the U.S. National Institutes of Health in 2007.47  The U.S. is the leading 
governmental contributor globally.48  Government science budgets also 
contain some health-related funding, which in some countries is quite 
substantial.49  In addition, private non-profit support has been valuable and 
influential, especially from the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, which has 
committed $7.8 billion to global health through the end of 2006.50  The 
private non-profit sector accounts for approximately 7% of global health 
research.51  
By comparison, the patent-based drug industry trade association reports 
that global biopharmaceutical R&D spending was $55.2 billion in 2006.52  
Similar figures have been criticized as being possibly overstated.53  Relying 
indirectly on the industry-reported numbers, the Global Forum on Health 
Research estimates the total private for-profit R&D for health at $60.6 billion 
in 2003.54  
These estimates of global health R&D understate the true public 
contribution because they do not include indirect funds such as tax 
expenditures to support pharmaceutical R&D and additional periods of 
marketing exclusivity.55  These amounts can be quite significant.  In the U.S., 
                                                 
46  Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, Rx R&D Myths:  The Case Against The 
Drug Industry’s R&D “Scare Card” 7 (July 2001) (critiquing the success of pharmaceutical 
innovation, including a description of the role of public investment); but see Ernst & Young 
LLP, Pharmaceutical Industry R&D Costs:  Key Findings about the Public Citizen 
Report (Aug. 8, 2001) (industry-funded response).  For a recent proposal concerning publicly 
funded R&D, see Ron A. Bouchard, Balancing Public and Private Interests in the 
Commercialization of Publicly Funded Medical Research:  Is There a Role for Compulsory 
Government Royalty Fees?, 13 B.U. J. Sci. & Tech. L. 120 (2007) (calling for compulsory 
government royalties on publicly funded medical research in order to reallocate the benefits 
and burdens of this public expenditure). 
47  NIH Budget 2007, available at  www.nih.gov/about/budget.htm.  
48  Hamilton Moses III et al., Financial Anatomy of Biomedical Research, 294 J. Am. 
Med. Ass’n. 1333-42 (2005); European Science Foundation, EMRC White Paper:  
Present Status and Future Strategy for Medical Research in Europe 16-19 (2007) 
available at 
www.esf.org/index.php?eID=tx_ccdamdl_file&p[file]=14135&p[dl]=1&p[pid]=3728&p[site]
=European%20Science%20Foundation&p[t]=1206461812&hash=8d01cb88ad535079299fd6d
a5fcd9f18&l=en.   
49  OECD, Science, Technology and Industry Scoreboard 36-7 (2007). 
50  Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, 2006 Annual Report 14 (2006). 
51  Global Forum for Health Research, supra note 44, at 36.  
52  Accenture, The Pursuit of High Performance through Research and 
Development:  Understanding Pharmaceutical Research and Development Cost 
Drivers 4 fig. 2.1.1 (2007).    
53  Merrill Goozner, The $800 Million Pill:  The Truth Behind the Cost of New 
Drugs (2004); Public Citizen’s Congress Watch, supra note 46; but see Ernst & Young 
LLP, supra note 46.  
54  Global Forum for Health Research, supra note 44, at 39.  The Global Forum 
statistics are derived from the OECD, which itself uses the PhRMA figures for U.S. R&D.   
George Messinis, R&D Price Inflation, Real BERD and Innovation:  Pharmaceuticals, 
OECD 1980-2000 (Working Paper No. 18) (May 2004)  available at 
www.cfses.com/documents/pharma/18-Inflation_Real_BERD_&_%20Innovation_Messinis.p 
df.  For estimates of U.S. R&D spending for health, see  Moses III et al., supra note 48, at 
1333-42.  These figures include only direct expenditures, and exclude tax expenditures.     
55  Personal written communication from Hamilton Moses III (Dec. 7, 2007 ) (on file 
with author).  See  Moses III et al., supra note 48.   
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the R&D tax credit,56 pediatric testing exclusivity extension,57 and the Orphan 
Drug tax credit58 provide subsidies for qualifying research and clinical trial 
expenses.  The U.S. Possessions tax credit provided an additional benefit of 
$1.1 billion in 2003, most of which went to the pharmaceutical industry.59  For 
Merck, the size of its Possessions Tax Credit was dwarfed by the $1.024 billion 
amount saved through tax provisions that permit deferral of foreign income.60  
Periods of marketing exclusivity are granted under existing U.S. law for 
clinical trials data,61 pediatric testing,62 and orphan drugs.63  The cost of 
extending market exclusivity is unclear, but can easily exceed billions of 
dollars.64  The appropriate adjustments for these incentives may be 
conservatively estimated at no less than $15 billion globally, particularly when 
incentives from outside the U.S. and reimbursement incentives are included.65  
As adjusted, public investments in health R&D are probably significantly 
larger than private for-profit investments (see Table 1).  
TABLE 1.  ESTIMATED GLOBAL HEALTH R&D, 2003 (BILLIONS)66 
 Direct Adjusted % 
Total 125.8 125.8  
   Private for-profit 60.6 45.6 36% 
   Private non-profit   9.0   9.0   7% 
   Public 56.1 71.1 57% 
                                                 
56  26 U.S.C. sec. 41 (2007).  The U.S. Treasury estimates the R&D tax credit was 
$4.630 billion in FY 2004, but did not separately report the portion awarded to the 
pharmaceutical industry.  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 42, at 100.   
57  Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 111 
STAT. 2296 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355a).  
58  Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1982) (codified as amended as 
21 U.S.C. §§ 360aa-360ee (1994), 26 U.S.C. § 45C (Supp. 11 1994), 42 U.S.C. § 236 (1994)).  
David Duffield Rohde, The Orphan Drug Act: An Engine of Innovation? At What Cost?, 55 
Food & Drug L.J. 125, 131 (2000).  David Loughnot, Potential Interactions of the Orphan 
Drug Act and Pharmacogenomics:  A Flood of Orphan Drugs and Abuses?, 31 Am. J.L. & Med. 
365, 365 (2005).  The orphan drug tax credit amounts to approximately $180 to $200 million 
per year.  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, supra note 42, at 105 tbl. 4, app. III.  
59  Daniel S. Holik, U.S. Possessions Corporations Returns, 2003, Statistics of 
Income Bulletin 113, 115 fig. C (2006) (the “pharmaceuticals and medicines” industrial 
group accounted for 53.1%). 
60  Merck’s Possessions Tax Credit for 2006 was only $87 million.  Merck & Co. Inc., 
Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 114 (Feb. 28, 2007). 
61  Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 346a(i)(1) (2007). 
62  Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 111.   
63  Orphan Drug Act § 527.   
64  Two recent estimates have been made; the lower of the two projected a $7.7 billion 
cost for a single two year “wild card” transferable patent extension.  B. Spellberg et al., Societal 
Costs Versus Savings from Wild-Card Patent Extension Legislation to Spur Critically Needed 
Antibiotic Development, 35 Infection 167, 167 (2007); Kevin Outterson et al., Will Longer 
Antimicrobial Patents Improve Global Public Health? 7 Lancet Infectious Diseases 559, 
561 (2007). 
65  In its comments to the WHO IGWG, the U.S. Government called for additional “tax 
credits to encourage research and development into medicines related to neglected or orphan 
diseases.”  U.S. Government Comments on Annexes I and II of the World Health 
Organization (WHO) Secretariat’s Elements of a Global Strategy and Plan of Action, at 8, 
Doc. A /PHI/IGWG/1/5, available at www.who.int/phi/submissions/USA-Comments.pdf 
[hereinafter, U.S. Comments].   
66  Global Forum for Health Research, supra note 44, at 39 tbl 2.1.   
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To a large extent, high-income country governments make the market for 
pharmaceuticals.  Given this fact, separating the public and private 
contributions to pharmaceutical R&D becomes exceedingly difficult.  But it is 
clear that direct measures of R&D greatly understate the public contributions 
through tax expenditures, regulatory exclusivity, and public reimbursement.  
The lion’s share comes from the public purse. 
C.  Implications for LMICs 
The patent-based pharmaceutical R&D and distribution systems in high-
income countries function as well as they do in large part because of elaborate 
and expensive subsidy and social insurance mechanisms.  Poorer countries 
generally lack these resources.  They cannot afford multi-billion dollar NIH-
style grant programs to focus attention on local health conditions.  They do 
not subsidize the cost of the vast array of patented medicines to the point 
where they are affordable.67  Their citizens are much poorer and cannot afford 
most patented medicines.  Global pharmaceutical markets simply do not work 
as well for the world’s non-wealthy people, perhaps 85% of humanity.68  
Special provisions for enhanced access to medicines and TRIPS flexibilities 
are called for in these situations, especially if access can be provided without 
undermining optimal incentives for innovation in high-income markets.   
Furthermore, the following section describes why disease-specific limitations 
are inappropriate. 
III.   GLOBAL DISEASE BURDENS  
While pharmaceutical markets vary significantly with the wealth of 
customers and governments, variations in global disease burdens call for 
careful analysis.  As described above, attempts have been made to limit access 
initiatives and TRIPS flexibilities to specific diseases or categories, such as the 
“Big 3” infections diseases (AIDS/HIV, malaria and tuberculosis) or “public 
health emergencies.”  Similarly, global drug companies have generally limited 
their differential pricing policies in LMICs to drugs treating AIDS, malaria 
and a small number of other drugs.69 An implicit assumption is that these 
conditions represent the greatest disease burdens in LMICs.  In fact, these 
infectious diseases are not the most significant drivers of disease burden in 
                                                 
67  Brazil has fully subsidized the price of AIDS medications as part of its aggressive 
treatment and prevention program.  The high price had prevented Brazil from making similar 
commitments across other treatment categories.  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 97-
100 fig. 4.3; Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 8, at 133.  Brazil’s threatened compulsory 
licenses may have saved US$1 billion in AIDS treatment costs between 2001 and 2005.  Amy 
S. Nunn, et al., Evolution of Antiretroviral Drug Costs in Brazil in the Context of Free and 
Universal Access to AIDS Treatment, 4 PLoS Med. 1804, 1809 (2007). 
68  Paul Hunt, supra note 31, at 1; WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 23; see also 
Oxfam, supra note 31, at 2.  
69  Oxfam, supra note 31, at 13.  
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LMICs, where noncommunicable or chronic diseases play an increasingly 
significant role.70 
The Global Forum for Health Research categorizes diseases and disease 
burdens in LMICs.  Their system focuses on medical categories: 
Group 1:  communicable diseases, maternal and perinatal 
conditions and nutritional deficiencies 
Group 2:  noncommunicable conditions (NCDs), including 
cardiovascular disease, diabetes, cancer and mental and 
neurological conditions 
Group 3:  injuries, both intentional and unintentional71 
In high-income countries, the great majority of burden of disease comes 
from Group 2; in LMICs, Groups 1 and 2 both account for large shares of the 
burden of disease.72  Historically, some thought of Group 2 diseases, such as 
heart disease, as diseases of affluence; and Group 1 diseases, such as infant 
mortality and infections, as diseases of poverty.  But the diseases of affluence 
and poverty are converging.  As the Global Forum for Health Research states:   
A long-standing stereotype has held that noncommunicable 
conditions are ‘diseases of affluence’ characteristic of developed 
countries, while developing countries mainly suffer from 
communicable diseases.  It is clear that this no longer applies and 
that a major epidemiological transition has taken place:  there is 
an almost equal level of BoD [Burden of Disease] due to Group 1 
and Group 2 for LMICs and a significantly higher rate of DALYs 
[Disability Adjusted Life Years] in LMICs due to injuries.73 
The top ten causes of death and burden of disease in LMICs (see Table 2) 
include several conditions that are also top killers in high-income countries, in 
addition to more “traditional” diseases of poverty. 
TABLE 2.  BURDEN OF DISEASE IN LMICS 
 Death (2001)74 Death (2020 est.)75 Burden of disease  
(2001, DALY)76 
1. Ischaemic heart 
disease 
Ischaemic heart 
disease 
Perinatal conditions 
                                                 
70  See, e.g., Roger S. Magnusson, Non-Communicable Diseases and Global Health 
Governance:  Enhancing Global Processes to Improve Health Development, 3 Globalization & 
Health (May 22, 2007) available at www.globalizationandhealth.com/content/3/1/2. 
71  Global Forum for Health Research, 2 Global Forum Update on Research 
for Health 1, 10-11 (2005); see also Alan Lopez & Colin Mathers, Inequities in Health Status: 
Findings From the 2001 Global Burden of Disease Study, 4 Global Forum Update on 
Research for Health 163, 164 (2007). 
72  Global Forum for Health Research, supra note 71, at 11 fig. 3.  
73  Id. at 11; for more information on DALY see Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY), 
http://www.who.int/healthinfo/boddaly/en/. 
74  Lopez & Mathers, supra note 71, at 169 tbl. 2.   
75  Shah Ebrahim & Liam Smeeth, Non-Communicable Diseases in Low and Middle-
Income Countries:  A Priority or a Distraction?,  34 Int’l. J. Epidemiology 961, 962 tbl. 2 
(2005).   
76  Lopez & Mathers, supra note 71, at 171-72 tbls. 7 & 8.  
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2. Cerebrovascular 
disease 
Cerebrovascular 
disease 
Lower respiratory 
infections 
3. Lower respiratory 
infection 
Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
Ischaemic heart disease 
4. HIV/AIDS Tuberculosis Cerebrovascular disease 
5. Perinatal conditions Road traffic accidents HIV/AIDS 
6. Chronic obstructive  
pulmonary disease 
Lower respiratory 
infections 
Diarrhoeal diseases 
7. Diarrhoeal diseases Trachea, bronchus, 
and lung cancers 
Unipolar depressive 
disorders 
8. Tuberculosis Stomach cancer Malaria 
9. Malaria Diarrhoeal disease Chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
10. Road traffic 
accidents 
HIV/AIDS Tuberculosis 
 
Noncommunicable diseases (NCDs) are an increasingly significant 
problem in the developing world.77  As Lopez and Mathers note: 
Surprisingly, almost 50% of the adult disease burden in low- and 
middle-income countries is now attributable to 
noncommunicable disease.  Population ageing and changes in the 
distribution of risk factors have accelerated the epidemic of 
noncommunicable disease in many developing countries.78 
IV. MARKETS AND THE GLOBAL BURDEN OF DISEASE 
The WHO CIPIH Report took a different taxonomic path to describe the 
global burden of disease, following the terminology of the Commission on 
Macroeconomics & Health (CMH).79  The CMH and the WHO CIPIH Report 
categorized diseases with a market-based approach, according to their 
intrinsic appeal to global capitalism, and in particular with reference to the 
markets for innovation and medicine. 
A.  Type I Disease Innovations 
Type I diseases occur in high-income countries.  The purchasing power of 
the high-income countries drives innovation for Type I diseases.  Examples 
                                                 
77  See, e.g. the special issue of The Lancet in December 2007 devoted to the burden of 
chronic diseases, with several articles focusing upon LMICs.  Dele O Abegunde et al., The 
Burden and Costs of Chronic Diseases in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries, 370 The 
Lancet 1929 (2007); Stephen S Lim et al., Prevention of Cardiovascular Disease in High-Risk 
Individuals in Low-Income and Middle-Income Countries:  Health Effects and Costs, 370 The 
Lancet 2054 (2007); Robert Beaglehole et al., Prevention of Chronic Diseases:  A Call To 
Action, 370 The Lancet 2152 (2007).  For a somewhat contrarian view, see Ebrahim & 
Smeeth, supra note 76; but see Kathleen Strong et al., Preventing Chronic Disease:  A Priority 
For Global Health, Int’l. J. Epidemiology 492 (2006) (letter responding to the Ebrahim & 
Smeeth article).  The WHO CIPIH Report strongly noted the growing rate of 
noncommunicable disease.  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 2-5, 44. 
78  Lopez & Mathers, supra note 71, at 172. 
79  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 13. 
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include cardiovascular disease, stroke, cancer, depression, and diabetes.  
These diseases may also be prevalent in LMICs,80 but the defining 
characteristic of Type I diseases is a strong market demand for treatment of 
high-income patients.  SARS and pandemic influenza are also Type I disease 
markets.  Innovation in Type I diseases can be sufficiently supported by high-
income markets alone. 
Some Type I diseases disproportionately affect people in LMICs.  Take the 
example of cervical cancer.  The WHO Commission listed cervical cancer as a 
Type I disease.81  In high-income countries, deaths from cervical cancer are 
relatively rare due to expensive population screening and treatment.  About 
260,000 women in developing countries die from cervical cancer each year,82 
exceeding the deaths from all diseases in the tropical-disease cluster.83  A 
highly effective vaccine is now available to prevent most cases of cervical 
cancer,84 but the price – US$360 per person – exceeds the per capita annual 
health budgets for most of the women worldwide who need it.85  A relatively 
small number of deaths in high-income countries led to these two HPV 
vaccines that hold great promise in LMICs as well.  These vaccines could be 
provided generically to the poorest without undermining optimal innovation.  
The deaths of less than 17,000 women per year in wealthy countries offered 
sufficient financial rewards to prompt both Merck and GlaxoSmithKline to 
spend hundreds of millions of dollars to bring HPV vaccines to market.  The 
deaths of more than 222,000 poor women per year may have provided moral, 
scientific or humanitarian incentives to create HPV vaccines, but the potential 
financial rewards were modest, since these women cannot afford it.86  Merck 
has announced an equitable access program,87 and some limited donations, 
but the scope of the program remains unknown at the present.88 
B.  Type III Disease Innovations 
Type III diseases are overwhelmingly or exclusively incident in developing 
countries.  Little or no global commercial market exists for Type III diseases.  
Examples include onchocerciasis (river blindness), leishmaniasis (kala-azar), 
Chagas disease, and African sleeping sickness.  
                                                 
80  See Bradly Condon & Tapen Sinha, Global Diseases, Global Patents and Differential 
Treatment in WTO Law:  Criteria for Suspending Patent Obligations in Developing Countries, 
26 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 1, 25-28 (2005).  
81  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 14 tbl. 1.3.  
82  F. Kamangar et al., Patterns of Cancer Incidence, Mortality, and Prevalence Across 
Five Continents:  Defining Priorities to Reduce Cancer Disparities in Different Geographic 
Regions of the World, 24 J.  Clin. Oncology 2137 (2006). 
83  C.D. Mathers et al., Global Burden of Disease and Risk Factors 52 tbl. 3.1 
(Oxford/World Bank, 2006). 
84  See Diane M. Harper et al., Sustained Efficacy Up To 4.5 Years of a Bivalent L1 
Virus-Like Particle Vaccine Against Human Papillomavirus Types 16 and 18: Follow-Up From 
a Randomised Control Trial, 367 The Lancet 1247 (2006). 
85  Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 8.  
86  Id.  
87  Press Release, Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, Cervical Cancer Vaccine Project 
(Oct. 2006), available at  www.path.org/files/RH_cc_vacc_proj_fs_update.pdf. 
88  Press Release, Merck, Merck To Donate Three Million Doses of Gardasil, its Cervical 
Cancer Vaccine, to Support Vaccination Programs in Lowest Income Nations (Sept. 26, 2007).  
Three million doses will vaccinate one million women, a very small percentage of the need.   
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Many have recognized the market failures inherent in Type III diseases.89  
For these diseases, normal market conditions will be inadequate to stimulate 
sufficient R&D.  Impoverished sick people are not attractive markets for 
global for-profit R&D programs.90  Type III disease innovation will require 
substantial non-market incentives, such as public-private product 
development partnerships91 and market-making devices such as Advanced 
Market Commitments92 or patent prizes.93  Others look to non-market 
incentives such as grants and government-sponsored research.94  Occasionally, 
proposals are coupled with an expansion of IP rights in poor countries,95 or a 
choice between exercising IP rights in either developed or developing 
countries, but not both.96  Expanded IP rights are an unnecessary and 
unwelcome addition for neglected disease research.  Expansion of IP rights 
will not create incentives in the absence of money to buy the product.  These 
diseases are neglected due to the poverty of the afflicted, not the lack of IP 
rights.97  
While Type III diseases are significant, we should note that total global 
deaths from the tropical-disease cluster in 2001 were only 128,000 people.98  
Residents of LMICs suffer from higher infectious disease burdens, but much 
of the DALYs lost stems from noncommunicable diseases, injuries, and 
communicable diseases other than the tropical and neglected disease cluster.99  
                                                 
89  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 22 (“as is the case for diseases affecting 
millions of poor people in developing countries, patents are not a relevant factor or effective in 
stimulating R&D and bringing new products to market.”); see also Carl Nathan, Aligning 
Pharmaceutical Innovation With Medical Need, 13 Nature Med. 304 (2007).  For a review of 
the literature, see Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 4, at 244-50. 
90  See, e.g., Médicins Sans Frontiéres, Access to Essential Medicines Campaign 
& Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group, Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis in 
Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases (2001). 
91  Mary Moran et al., The New Landscape of Neglected Disease Drug 
Development (2005), available at www.wellcome.ac.uk.  
92  Michael Kremer & Rachel Glennerster, Strong medicine: Creating 
incentives for pharmaceutical research on neglected diseases 119 (Princeton 
University Press 2004). 
93  Aiden Hollis, An Efficient Reward System For Pharmaceutical Innovation 1 (Oct. 6, 
2004), available at www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/Submission-Hollis6-Oct.pdf.   
94  See Hubbard & Love, supra note 29; but see Joseph A. DiMasi & Henry G. 
Grabowski, Patents and R&D Incentives: Comments on the Hubbard and Love Trade 
Framework For Financing Pharmaceutical R&D 2 (June 25, 2004), available at 
www.who.int/intellectualproperty/news/en/Submission3.pdf.  
95  Alan O. Sykes, TRIPS, Pharmaceuticals, Developing Countries, and the Doha 
Solution, 3 Chi. J. Int’l. L. 47, 56 (2002); Neglected Diseases:  Towards Policies Without 
Borders, 262 OECD Observer (July 2007), available at www.oecdobserver.org/news/fullstory 
.php/aid/2282/Neglected_diseases.html. 
96  Jean O. Lanjouw & William Jack, Trading Up: How Much Should Poor Countries 
Pay to Support Pharmaceutical Innovation?, 4 Ctr. For Global Development Brief, Nov. 
2004, at 1, available at www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/2842/.  
97  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 22; Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 4, 
at 244-50. 
98  Mathers et al., supra note 83, at 52 tbl. 3.1.  
99  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 3-4 tbls. 1.1 & 1.2.  
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C. Type II Disease Innovations 
Type II diseases occupy an intermediate category, sharing some 
characteristics of the other categories.  LMICs suffer a disproportionately 
large burden from Type II diseases.  Tuberculosis and malaria were once Type 
I diseases, but are now classified as Type II by the WHO after virtual 
eradication of malaria in the U.S. and Europe, and a significantly lower 
disease burden from tuberculosis in high-income countries.  Malaria is 
classified as Type II rather than Type III because it retains a small but 
significant financial footprint in the high-income countries to meet the needs 
of the military and international travelers.  If multiple-drug resistant and 
extremely-drug resistant tuberculosis spread significantly in high-income 
countries, tuberculosis may regain Type I status.  
Innovation in Type II diseases also occupies an intermediate category.  In 
many cases, innovation for high-income markets will be sufficient to create 
the necessary drugs.  Such was the case with AIDS and the existing treatments 
for malaria and tuberculosis.  But the global medical burden of malaria and 
tuberculosis has outmatched the innovation spurred by relatively modest 
high-income country markets.  Type II diseases will require additional non-
market incentives to fully correlate global need with innovation incentives.100  
The WHO Commission classified AIDS as a Type II disease,101 but that 
appears to be a debatable choice.  AIDS is perhaps better classified as a Type I 
disease.  While the greatest burden of AIDS disease falls outside of high-
income countries, more than 2 million people are living with HIV in high-
income countries102 and infection rates are rising.103  This high-income patient 
base is more than sufficient to spur innovation.  The AIDS cases in the U.S. 
and Europe sparked an avalanche of research, even before the true scope of 
the global crisis was known.  AIDS may be considered a Type I disease at 
present, with the exception of adaptive research. 
D.  Adaptive Innovations for Type I Diseases 
Additional incentives may be required to adapt Type I innovations to 
developing country conditions.104  Heat-stable formulations105 and fixed-dose 
combinations106 are examples of adaptive innovations for a Type I disease 
(AIDS).  Simpler and cheaper diagnostics are required for resource-
constrained settings.  Geographic variations in HPV subtype incidence might 
require additions to the cervical cancer vaccines.107  All of these are examples 
of adaptive innovation for Type I diseases.  In the language of the WHO 
                                                 
100  See, e.g., Nathan, supra note 29, at 304-308.   
101  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 14.  
102  UNAIDS, Fact Sheet:  Key Facts by Region – 2007 AIDS Epidemic Update 
(Nov. 2007), data.unaids.org/pub/EPISlides/2007/2007_epiupdate_en.pdf (estimating that 
2.1 million people are living with HIV in 2007 in North America, Western and Central 
Europe).  
103  Gardiner Harris, Figures on H.I.V. Rate Expected to Rise, N.Y. Times, Dec. 2, 2007 
(reporting that estimates on U.S. infection rates may be 50% higher than previously thought). 
104  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 16-19, 44. 
105  Outterson & Kesselheim, supra note 8.   
106  Pharmaceutical Arbitrage, supra note 4, at 234. 
107  Nubia Munoz et al., Against Which Human Papillomavirus Types Shall We 
Vaccinate and Screen?  The International Perspective, 111 Int’l. J. Cancer 278, 281-84 (2004). 
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Draft Global Strategy (2007), these are “needs of developing countries in 
relation to Type I diseases.”108  Some of this adaptive innovation may come 
from drug companies located in developing countries, where cost structures 
are lower and researchers may be closer to the ground.109  Other adaptive 
innovations may require non-market incentives, similar to other neglected 
disease issues. 
E.  Important Distinctions Between Markets for Innovation and 
Medicine 
The WHO typology is helpful for analyzing differences in the markets for 
innovation and medicine between high-income countries and LMICs.  
Disease-specific incentives are required for innovation market failures in Type 
II and III diseases, but limitations are not appropriate for access programs 
and TRIPS flexibilities.  The relevant factors are summarized in Table 3 
below: 
TABLE 3.  MARKETS FOR INNOVATION AND MEDICINES, BY DISEASE 
TYPE AND INCOME LEVEL.  
 Innovation Market Medicine Market 
Type I   
 - HICs High-income country 
purchasing power drives the 
market (ex: Lipitor for high 
cholesterol). 
 
Innovation follows purchasing 
power rather than medical need 
(ex:  additional lifestyle and me-
too drugs rather than a first-in-
class Gram-negative antibiotic). 
Patent protection and 
sophisticated branding and 
marketing yield high drug 
prices.   
 
The impact of high prices is 
ameliorated by private and 
social insurance mechanisms, 
relatively high per capita 
incomes, and (in some cases) 
government monopsony 
procurement. 
 - LMICs Adaptive R&D may be needed 
to account for resource-
constrained settings (ex. non-
refrigerated vaccines, polyvalent 
HPV vaccines, fixed-dose 
combinations).   
 
Regional companies may be 
able to supply some adaptive 
R&D.  The balance must be 
Patent-based pricing denies 
access to the majority of direct 
purchasers.  Robust generic 
competition would drive prices 
closer to marginal cost (ex. 
unlicensed AIDS drugs) 
 
LMIC governments and donors 
have limited ability to subsidize 
access (cf: Thailand & Brazil’s 
                                                 
108  WHO, Draft Global Strategy and Plan of Action on Public Health, 
Innovation and Intellectual Property:  Progress to Date in Drafting Groups A and 
B 4-5, A/PI/IGWG/2/Conf.Paper No.1 Rev.1 (Dec. 14, 2007) [hereinafter WHO Draft 
Global Strategy (2007)].  
109  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 45. 
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provided through non-market 
incentives. 
AIDS programs). 
Type II   
 - HICs Largely ignored by high-income 
markets, except by tourists, 
military and other modest 
markets (ex:  prophylaxis for 
malaria). 
Patented Type II innovative 
medicines are generally limited 
to HIC citizens who are 
residents in LMICs (ex: military, 
tourists, expats, wealthy local 
elites). 
 -LMICs Adequate levels of innovation 
require additional R&D support 
from non-market incentives 
(ex:  malaria vaccine) 
LMIC governments and donors 
have limited ability to subsidize 
access.  Best medical practice 
may require significant subsidies 
to prevent resistance to 
communicable diseases (ex:  
subsidies for ACTs for malaria).  
Type III   
 - HICs No market in HICs.   No medical need in HICs. 
 - LMICs These very neglected diseases 
require non-market incentives 
to support innovation.  
Significant unmet medical need 
in LMICs. 
V.   DISEASE-SPECIFIC LIMITATIONS IN THE WHO IGWG 
With this background, we now turn to the current discussions within the 
WHO IGWG concerning disease-specific limitations.  The December 14, 2007 
draft of the WHO Draft Global Strategy (2007)110 frequently uses the 
following disease-limiting phrase or its permutations:  “diseases which 
disproportionately affect developing countries.”111  The phrase was 
prominently discussed in the WHO CIPIH Report,112 and was mentioned in 
the World Health Assembly Resolution that established the IGWG.113  The 
phrase is occasionally used as an apparent synonym for Type II and III 
diseases. 
A.  The U.S. Position 
The United States Government appears to consider the phrase as a 
limitation on access programs.  In the U.S. Comments to the WHO 
Elements of a Global Strategy (2006), the United States claimed that the 
IGWG’s mandate was limited to Type II and III diseases: 
                                                 
110  WHO Draft Global Strategy (2007).  An earlier draft is WHO, Elements of a 
Global Strategy and Plan of Action, A/PHI/IGWG/1/5 (Dec. 8, 2006) [hereinafter WHO 
Elements of a Global Strategy (2006)].  
111  WHO Draft Global Strategy (2007), at 3-5 ¶¶ 3, 4, 13, 14(a), 14(b).    
112  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1. 
113  World Health Assembly [WHA] Res. 59.24 (May 27, 2006).   
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The IGWG should not consider Recommendation 2.4 as the focus 
of its work should be on diseases that disproportionately affect 
developing countries, more commonly referred to as Type II and 
Type III diseases.114  
The United States was commenting on Recommendation 2.4 from the WHO 
CIPIH Report, which explicitly included Type I diseases in its ambit: 
When addressing the health needs of people in developing 
countries, it is important to seek innovative ways of combating 
Type I diseases, as well as Type II and Type III diseases.  
Governments and funders need to assign higher priority to 
combating the rapidly growing impact of Type I diseases in 
developing countries, and, through innovation, to finding 
affordable and technologically appropriate means for their 
diagnosis, prevention and treatment.115 
Other actions by the U.S. Government have attempted to limit IGWG 
consideration of TRIPs flexibilities, especially with regard to Type I diseases.  
For example, the WHO CIPIH Report116 and the World Health Assembly 
Resolution 59.24117 supported the use of TRIPS flexibilities by developing 
countries.  The WHO Elements of a Global Strategy (2006) included the 
following “areas for action:” 
6(a)  enact legislation in developed and developing countries for 
application of the flexibilities provided for in TRIPS and other 
international agreements 
6(f)  assure that bilateral trade agreements do not seek to 
incorporate “TRIPS-plus” protection in ways that might reduce 
access to medicines in developing countries 
6(i)  focus on specific aspects of the intellectual property system, 
such as test data exclusivity, ‘me-too’ patents, and patent linkages 
7(i)  take necessary legislative steps in developed countries, and 
other countries with manufacturing and export capacity, to allow 
compulsory licensing for  export consistent with the flexibilities 
provided for in TRIPS 
7(j)  provide in national legislation for measures to encourage 
generic entry on patent expiry, such as the ‘early working’ 
exception, and more generally policies that support greater 
competition between generics, whether branded or not, as an 
effective way to enhance access by improving affordability; 
restrictions should not be placed on the use of generic names118 
                                                 
114  U.S. Comments, supra note 65, at 2.  
115  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 48 (Recommendation 2.4). 
116  Id. at 22.  
117  WHA Res. 59.24, supra note 113, at § 2 ¶ 4.   
118  WHO Elements of a Global Strategy (2006), supra note 110, at 6-8.  
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The U.S. Comments requested that these discussions of TRIPS 
flexibilities be excluded from the WHO IGWG process:119    
Accordingly, the IGWG should not consider Subsection (a) of 
Paragraph Six of the document.  The WHO Secretariat should 
not expand its work on matters better addressed by another 
international organization.  Therefore, the IGWG should not 
consider Subsections (f) and (i) of Paragraph Six of the 
document, because they more appropriately fit within the scope 
and mandate of the WTO and WIPO.120 
While Subparagraph (j) of Paragraph Seven is important when 
balanced with incentives to develop new drugs, neither 
subparagraph (i) or (j) are appropriate areas of action for the 
WHO Secretariat; thus the IGWG should not consider them.121 
The U.S. Comments are thus making a narrow, technocratic argument that 
the WHO is an inappropriate forum for discussing the intellectual property 
rights issues relating to access to medicines.  They are trying to prevent 
discussion in a forum that might actually give some weight to global health.  
This argument ignores the history of the IGWG process, which was designed 
to offer a balanced, integrated analysis of intellectual property rights, 
innovation and public health.   Each step of this process has highlighted all 
three issues:  The WHO Commission on Intellectual Property Rights, 
Innovation and Public Health; the WHO CIPIH Report entitled Public 
Health, Innovation & Intellectual Property Rights; and the WHO 
IGWG on Public Health, Innovation and Intellectual Property.   The 
WHO is not claiming exclusive jurisdiction over these issues, but merely the 
opportunity to speak to issues which impact global public health.  
B.  Disease-Specific Limitations Are Not Appropriate 
Nothing in the TRIPs Agreement or the Doha Declaration limits access 
programs or TRIPS flexibilities to Type II and III diseases.  Neither does the 
WHO CIPIH Report, which cannot be read as arguing for any such 
restriction.   
The phrase “diseases which disproportionately affect developing 
countries” is best understood as an explanation for why the market has failed 
to produce medicines for neglected (Type II) or very neglected (Type III) 
diseases: diseases which disproportionately affect poor people in LMICs are 
not an attractive market for the patent-based drug industry.  As the WHO 
CIPIH Report concluded: 
                                                 
119  U.S. Comments, supra note 65, at 4-6, ¶¶ 7-8.  The U.S. Comments suggest that the 
WTO and WIPO are the better fora.  
120  Id. at  5 ¶ 6. 
121  Id. at 5 ¶ 7. 
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Too few R&D resources are directed to the health needs of 
developing countries.  In the private sector, companies do not 
have the incentive to devote adequate resources to develop 
products specifically adapted to the needs of developing 
countries, because profitability is mainly to be found in rich 
country markets.  The great majority of health research funded by 
the public sector, takes place in developed countries, and its 
priorities principally reflect their own disease burden, resource 
position and social and economic circumstances.122   
Difficulties with the U.S. position are made more evident when one 
attempts to construct a list of qualifying diseases.  The adverb 
“disproportionately” appears to require that incidence on a per capita basis be 
significantly higher.  Surely the list includes all Type III diseases, including 
the very neglected tropical diseases, for by definition the per capita incidence 
is almost exclusively in LMICs.  Similarly, the largest Type II diseases such as 
malaria and tuberculosis appear to qualify.  For all of these diseases, markets 
are unable to stimulate the R&D required for global health.    
AIDS presents a more troublesome case.  The incidence and burden of 
AIDS falls disproportionately on sub-Saharan Africa, but the same may not 
hold true for India or China.  As discussed above, AIDS may not be properly 
classified as a Type II disease at all, and its incidence is rising in the United 
States.123  
Other infectious diseases are quite common in LMICs, and result in a 
substantial burden of disease there.  In general, the incidence of infectious 
diseases falls disproportionately in LMICs, but significant medical need exists 
also in high-income countries for many infectious diseases.124  
Most noncommunicable or chronic diseases would probably not qualify.  
While heart disease, depression, stroke, and diabetes are certainly major 
contributors to the burden of disease in LMICs, they do not impose a 
disproportionately higher per capita burden.  If the phrase “diseases which 
disproportionately affect developing countries” is considered a limitation on 
access programs and TRIPS flexibilities, then almost all chronic and 
noncommunicable diseases must be excluded.   
Clearly, this is not an acceptable result.  This interpretation is without 
support in the WHO CIPIH Report, and is at odds with the mandate of the 
WHO IGWG.  The Report does not limit access programs or TRIPs 
flexibilities to specific diseases.  In fact, it recommended exactly the opposite.  
Recommendations 4.13 to 4.27 are primarily concerned with encouraging 
developing countries to take advantage of TRIPS flexibilities and other laws in 
order to protect public health, without any limitations as to disease.125  
Recommendation 4.7 specifically includes noncommunicable diseases:   
                                                 
122  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 172. 
123  See infra Part IV.C.  
124  See, e.g., Elli Klein et al., Hospitalizations and Deaths Caused By Methicillin-
Resistant Staphylococcus aureus, United States, 1999-2005, 13 Emerging Infectious 
Diseases 1840 (2007); R. Monina Klevens et al., Invasive Methicillin-Resistant 
Staphylococcus aureus Infections in the United States, 298 J. Am. Med. Ass’n. 1763 (2007). 
125  WHO CIPIH Report, supra note 1, at 180-82. 
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4.7  For noncommunicable diseases, governments and companies 
should consider how treatments, which are widely available in 
developed countries, can be made more accessible for patients in 
developing countries.126  
The phrase “diseases which disproportionately affect developing 
countries” is relevant only as a descriptive term, identifying innovation market 
failures: patent-based pharmaceutical innovation does not work for diseases 
which disproportionately affect developing countries.  Global markets 
underproduce commercial research on Type II diseases, Type III diseases, and 
adaptive research for Type I innovations for resource-constrained settings.  
No substantial market in high-income countries exists for these disease 
conditions, necessitating various non-market mechanisms in order to 
facilitate innovation.  By definition, these conditions disproportionately affect 
developing countries; otherwise they would be Type I innovations. 
Yet the innovation gap is not the only problem facing the IGWG.   Its 
terms of reference also include ensuring equitable access to patented 
innovations treating all diseases, including Type I, II and III diseases.  The 
market for medicines and the market for innovation must both be valued.  
WHA 59.24 urges member states: 
to work to ensure that progress in basic science and biomedicine 
is translated into improved, safe and affordable health products – 
drugs, vaccines and diagnostics – to respond to all patients’ and 
clients’ needs, especially those living in poverty, taking into 
account the critical role of gender, and to ensure that capacity is 
strengthened to support rapid delivery of essential medicines to 
people.127 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
The pharmaceutical IP system works to some degree in high-income 
countries with generous government subsidies and social insurance.  It does 
not work well for the poor in low- and middle-income countries.  For the 
market for medicines, governments should fully utilize all TRIPS flexibilities 
to protect the health of their citizens, without regard to the type of disease.  In 
particular, LMICs must be permitted to confront the growing burden of 
chronic diseases by using TRIPS flexibilities for any type of disease, including 
Type I.  The phrase “diseases disproportionately affecting developing 
countries” is in no way a limitation on the utilization of TRIPS flexibilities to 
improve the market for medicines in WTO Member countries.  Rather, it is an 
important reminder of a weakness in the market for innovation; global 
commercial markets will not invest sufficient amounts in diseases that 
disproportionately affect developing countries. 
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127  WHA Res. 59.24, supra note 113, at § 2 ¶ 3.  
